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Ivan's Order of Magnitude, (Tue, Jul 22nd)

Mon, 07/21/2014 - 20:33

ISC reader Frank reports seeing a couple odd DNS names in his DNS resolver log A=  TTL=30 NS= A=  TTL=30 NS=

As so often, the first step in the infection chain had been a visit to a benign, but unpatched and hacked Wordpress website. It redirected to an intermediary, which in turn redirected to the domains above. The subsequent http connection with Java exploit attempt was stopped by the proxy filters in Frank's case, so no harm done.

But looking at public passive DNS records, it is obvious that "something" is going on, and has been for a long while. Domain names of this pattern have been observed since about November 2013, and are associated with the Magnitude Exploit Kit. Snort and Emergingthreats have decent signatures, and flag the traffic as "MAGNITUDE EK".

The recently used domain names are all within the Indian TLD ".in", and checking the registration information, they were all registered by the same alleged "Ivan Biloev" from Moscow, and all of them via the same registrar ( They even suspended a handful of the domains because of abuse, but they apparently continue to let Ivan happily register new addresses. Maybe a registrar might want to have a chat with a customer who had domains revoked, before letting registrations for additional names go through??

Recent Magnitude mal-domains included, only to name a few:

Brad over at has a write-up [1] on a recent sample. If you have current intel on Magnitude EK, the domain name patterns, the exploits pushed in the current set, etc, then please share in the comments below or via our contact form.


(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Vulnerability Pipes

Keeping the RATs out: **it happens - Part 2, (Fri, Jul 18th)

Fri, 07/18/2014 - 09:40

As we learned in Part One of our exploration of Hazrat Supply's series of unfortunate events, our malicious miscreants favored multiple tools. We first discussed developing IOCs for HackTool:Win32/Zeloxat.A which opens a convenient backdoor on a pwned host. One note on that front, during analysis I saw network calls to (no need to visit, just trust me) and therefore added matching URI and DNS items to the IOC file. Again, I'll share them all completed for you in a day or two.
I know I promised you an analysis of the svchost dump file Jake provided using Volatility but unfortunately that effort did not bear much fruit; the imagecopy module didn't return actionable results. The actual svchost.exe sample is still an analysis work-in-progress as well given, while certainly malicious, the file we have was not an original payload and is exhibiting limited functionality. I do hope to have insight on that front tomorrow.
That said, one of the other tools that was found on the server by Jake was PWDump7. This is a commonly used tool and is often part of larger hacker or pentester kits; you should be detecting and blocking them both equally :-).
By definition, PwDump7.exe is not malware per se, it's simply a tool that can be used for malicious purposes. It doesn't make file system changes, it doesn't phone home, it doesn't change the registry, but it sure does dump password hashes as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1

The first reader who emails me (russ @ holisticinfosec dot org) my clear text password from the 500 hash as seen in Figure 1 wins a prize of my choosing (probably shwag or a book), I'll Tweet out the winner. *UPDATE* - We have a winner as of 0146 PST last night, thank you, Martin R. The password for you all is IveBeenHacked.
In the absence of particularly interesting artifacts, can we still create IOCs for hack tools such as PwDump?
But of course!
File name, file size, and hashes are obvious, but what else can we use when so little presents itself with a hack tool that is standalone and basically just runs?
Tools such as PEStudio can give us additional options if we look beyond the obvious. PEStudio, by default, will sort by color coded (red), flagged items. Often this presents some obvious enough indicators but with PwDump7, not so much. But sorting by something different such as Value under Strings and Unclassified gives us a perfectly unique indicator not likely to occur very often, particularly in the context of established file name and hashes. Figure 2 exemplifies.

Figure 2

As such, our IOC elements would be derived as seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3

Can't miss with strings keywords like that. :-)
I'll leave you with this. As we've been learning from the kind transparency of Jake and Hazrat Supply, **it happens, it really does.
Just another reason not to tailgate.

Russ McRee | @holisticinfosec

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Categories: Vulnerability Pipes